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I. INTRODUCTION
Maryland has taken a unique approach to address international
commercial arbitrations conducted within the state. In 1990, the Mary-
land General Assembly passed the Maryland International Commercial
Arbitration Act' (MICAA), which precludes the application of state
law to international arbitrations. Instead, the MICAA makes the uni-
form federal law the sole body of law to govern the process and en-
forcement of international commercial arbitrations occurring in Mary-
land. Consequently, the MICAA will add certainty and uniformity to
the business and legal climate for international arbitrations in this
state.
This article asserts that pending the enactment of a more compre-
hensive federal statute, the Maryland approach is the appropriate state
response to the need in the United States for a better and uniform law
governing the process and enforcement of international commercial ar-
bitration. In making this argument, the article first highlights the lack
of legal uniformity by surveying the different and overlapping schemes
applicable to international arbitration in the United States, including
the United States Arbitration Act2 (FAA) and the various state stat-
utes that address international commercial arbitration. Second, by
comparing the FAA with the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law, 3 this article will develop
the rationale behind the Maryland approach. This article suggests that
Congress should amend the FAA by expressly requiring it to preempt
state international arbitration laws. In conclusion, this article argues
that other states contemplating the enactment of international commer-
cial arbitration statutes should follow Maryland's lead. A bifurcated
multi-statute system leads to a host of complex litigation-generating
problems;" the Maryland approach, in contrast, will decrease the confu-
sion engendered by multiple statutes and add certainty to international
1. Maryland International Commercial Arbitration Act, MD. CODE ANN. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2B-01 to -09 (1992).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15, 201-208 (1988).
3. 24 I.L.M. 1302 (1985).
4. Jack Garvey & Totton Heffelfinger, Towards Federalizing U.S. International
Commercial Arbitration Law, 25 INT'L LAW 209, 211 (1991).
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commercial arbitrations.
II. OVERVIEW
Arbitration 5 has long been considered an important alternative to
litigation for resolving international business disputes.6 Commentators
have advanced three theories as to the nature of arbitration. The first
views arbitration as a private contract, unconstrained by the require-
ments of any external legal system; the second theory perceives arbitra-
tion as a true judicial proceeding, subject to the legal rules of the juris-
diction in which the arbitration will be conducted; and the third and
prevailing view7 regards arbitration as a hybrid of the other theories,
with only some of its elements contractual in nature.8 The incidence of
international commercial arbitration in the United States has rapidly
increased since World War II. 9 This expansion is a result of increased
international trade and the acceptance by the major trading nations of
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards, which is now part of the federal statutory framework
dealing with arbitration in the United States.10 Many nations compete
actively for international arbitration business."
Arbitration is an offshoot of the law of procedure and is a method
of resolving disputes by one or more third parties "who derive their
powers from agreement of the parties and whose decision is binding
5. Arbitration is "a process by which parties voluntarily refer their disputes to an
impartial third person, an arbitrator, selected by them for a decision based on the evi-
dence and arguments to be presented before the arbitration tribunal." MARTIN DOMKE,
DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (Wilner rev. ed. 1984).
6. See Rosabel E. Goodman, Advantages of International Arbitration, N.Y.L.J.,
Mar. 14, 1985, at 2 (discussing the advantages of international arbitration over
litigation).
7. Arden C. McClelland, Toward a More Mature System of International Com-
mercial Arbitration: The Establishment of Uniform Rules of Procedure and the Elim-
ination of the Conflict of Laws Question, 5 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 169, 185
(1980).
8. Sauser-Hall, L'arbitrage en Droit International Pri v, 44 ANNUAIRE DE
L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 416, 469 (Vienna 1952), cited in Gabriel M.
Wilner, Determining the Law of Performance in International Commercial Arbitra-
tion: A Comparative Study, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 646, 651 n.Il (1965).
9. See Commercial Arbitration for the 1990s, A.B.A. Sec. Of Litigation 127 (R.
Medalie ed. 1991) (noting that 220 new international arbitrations were instituted in
1990 through the American Arbitration Association) [hereinafter Commercial
Arbitration].
10. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1988).
11. See Commercial Arbitration, supra note 9, at 125.
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upon them."1 2 It can thus be viewed as a private method of dispute
resolution in which the parties agree to submit to a person not clothed
with judicial power by the state. 3 Four possible schemes govern inter-
national arbitration: contractual agreement, institutional arbitration
rules, national law, and international treaties.1" A court will consider
all of the applicable law when determining the validity, process, and
enforcement of an arbitration agreement.
The agreement is of primary significance; it contains the parties'
understanding that they will resolve current or future disputes through
arbitration, rather than through litigation.15 The agreement specifies
whether the arbitration will be conducted on an ad hoc basis or through
institutional proceedings. 6 If the parties agree to an ad hoc forum, the
arbitration is conducted according to the terms specified in the con-
tract. 7 The parties, however, may have difficulties drafting the terms
12. Henry P. De Vries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual
Substitute for National Courts, 57 TULANE L. REV. 42, 43 (1982); see also AT&T
Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986). The Su-
preme Court underscored the voluntariness of abiding by the arbitration agreement
since "[a]rbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes only because the parties
have agreed in advance to submit such grievances to arbitration." AT&T Technologies,
Inc., 475 U.S. at 648-49.
13. See Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE
L.J. 595, 597-98 (1928).
14. See Neil E. McDonell, The Availability of Provisional Relief in International
Commercial Arbitration, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 273, 273-74 (1984); ALAN
REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 37-51 (1986).
15. HOWARD M. HOLTZMAN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCI-
TRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 7 (1989).
16. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 14, at 37-41. The authors state:
In an ideal world, the choice between ad hoc and institutional arbitration
would only be made once a dispute has arisen. It would then be possible to
look at the nature of the dispute, to decide what kind of arbitral tribunal was
needed to deal with it, what procedures should be followed and, most impor-
tantly, to assess the extent to which the parties are likely to co-operate in the
conduct of the arbitration. In practice, however, the choice will usually have
to be made at a much earlier stage .... [T]he time to consider the relative
advantages and disadvantages of institutional and ad hoc arbitration is usu-
ally when the original contract between the parties is being negotiated.
Id. at 37-38.
17. See HOLTZMAN & NEUHAUS, supra note 15, at 6; see also Francis J. Higgins
et al., Pitfalls in International Commercial Arbitration, 35 Bus. LAW. 1035, 1036-37
(1980); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 14, at 39-41 ("An arbitration clause which
provides, for instance, for disputes to be referred to arbitration in Paris 'before a tribu-
nal of three arbitrators, one of whom is to be chosen by each party and a third by
agreement between the other two arbitrators' is a clause which provides for ad hoc
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of the contract because it is nearly impossible to foresee all the legal
intricacies when negotiating a complex international commercial agree-
ment. 18 Institutional arbitration is invoked when the parties do not set
forth specific arbitration proceedings in their contract, but instead refer
to a set of pre-existing arbitration rules. 19 Organizations such as the
American Arbitration Association"0 or the International Chamber of
Commerce help administer arbitration proceedings for a fee,2" and as-
sist the parties by providing administrative services22 and model arbi-
tration clauses.23
International arbitration, like domestic arbitration, requires the as-
sistance of the national judiciary to enforce the agreement to arbi-
trate. 4 National law generally sets forth the procedural parameters
arbitration."). Id. at 40.
18. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 14, at 41 (noting that ad hoc arbitration
operates smoothly only when an arbitral tribunal is in existence and a proper set of
rules have been established).
19. See William P. Mills, III, State International Arbitration Statutes and the
U.S. Arbitration Act: Unifying the Availability of Interim Relief, 13 FORDHAM INT'L
L. J. 604, 607 (1989-1990) (citing Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 98, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39), U.N.
Doc. A/31/39 (1976), reprinted in II Y.B. COMM. ARB. 161 (1977)); see also RED-
FERN & HUNTER, supra note 14, at 39 (noting that some disadvantages of institutional
arbitration are increased costs and delays due to the bureaucratic red tape).
20. The American Arbitration Association (AAA) is a private non-profit member-
ship corporation headquartered in New York. It has been active since 1926 and is the
largest of the world's arbitration institutions. See Commercial Arbitration, supra note
9, at 127.
21. Id. (The International Chamber of Commerce generally supervises the admin-
istration of international arbitration.); see REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 14, at 38;
ROBERT COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION - WHAT You NEED To KNOW 130-32 (3d
ed. 1986) (listing major arbitral institutions around the world).
22. See COULSON, supra note 21, at 121 (The organization may undertake the
"filing of papers, the appointment of arbitrators, the filling of any vacancies caused by
the death or disability of an arbitrator, and the details of the hearing.").
23. See De Vries, supra note 12, at 54.
24. Id. at 47. National courts assist and control the arbitration proceedings.
Specifically:
Courts assist arbitration proceedings by compelling arbitration, appointment
of arbitrators, their revocation or replacement; by compelling attendance of
witnesses and the taking of evidence; and in the area of provisional remedies,
by ordering conservatory measures by way of attachment of assets or disposal
of the subject matter of the action pending final determination. Courts also
assist by providing remedies after entry of the award, particularly measures of
execution against the defendant's assets. The function of control is exercised
by denying effect to an arbitration agreement, by annulment of an award, or
a review of its provisions on procedural or substantive grounds.
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that parties must follow in an arbitration proceeding.25 However, inter-
national treaties or conventions may also provide an effective method of
creating an international system of law governing international arbitra-
tion.2" Several international treaties address arbitration,27 the most im-
portant of which is the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention).28
In the United States, international commercial arbitration agree-
ments and proceedings are subject to at least three sources of national
law.29 First, contracts that involve interstate or foreign commerce, that
are within the admiralty jurisdiction or that may be the subject of liti-
Id. at 47 n.21.
25. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 14, at 42; Mills, supra note 19, at 607-
08; see also HOLTZMAN & NEUHAUS, supra note 15, at 8-9 ("[N]ational laws applica-
ble to an arbitration, as well as the agreement of the parties on procedure, including
any agreement to use particular arbitration rules, are intimately related to the means
by which international awards can be enforced.").
26. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 14, at 43.
27. See id. at 43-48. The first such treaty can be traced back to 1889. The Monte-
video Convention addressed the implementation of arbitration agreements between cer-
tain Latin American states. Id. at 44; see also HOLTZMAN & NEUHAUS, supra note 15,
at 8.
28. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3. Article II of the
Convention reads:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which
the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which
have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable
of settlement by arbitration.
Id. at 2519.
As of January 1, 1990, 83 countries were parties to the New York Convention:
Algeria, Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Benin,
Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, Fin-
land, France, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia,
Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pan-
ama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, San Marino, Singapore, South Africa,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand,
Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 282 (Jan 1, 1990).
29. Mills, supra note 19, at 608.
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gation in the federal courts8" are subject to the FAA. Commentators
have noted that because the FAA does not contain any subject matter
restrictions, its scope is quite broad.8 ' Second, contracts are subject to
the New York Convention, which the United States ratified in 1970
and is now codified as Chapter two of the FAA."2 Third, an arbitration
proceeding in the United States falls within the purview of state arbi-
tration laws."8 All states, along with the District of Columbia and Pu-
erto Rico, have enacted statutes addressing intrastate arbitration, " and
30. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924) [hereinafter HOUSE RE-
PORT]; S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT];
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, 201-208 (1988).
31. See generally, Michael F. Hoellering, Arbitrability of Disputes, 41 Bus. LAW.
125 (1985) (commenting that essentially all disputes can be subject to arbitration
proceedings).
32. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1988); see also, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506 (1974). The Supreme Court observed that:
The goal of the Convention, and the principal purpose underlying American
adoption and implementation of it, was to encourage the recognition and en-
forcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts
and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and
arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries.
Id. at 520 n.15.
33. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468 (1989).
34. Many of the state arbitration statutes are patterned after the Uniform Arbi-
tration Act (UAA). In 1955, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Bar Association initially approved the UAA. See UNIF.
ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-25, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1955).
Currently, 35 jurisdictions have adopted the UAA. See ALA. CODE §§ 6-6-1 to -16
(1977); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.010 - .180 (1983) (adopting UAA); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 12-1501 to -1518 (1982) (adopting UAA); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-108-201
to -224 (1987) (adopting UAA); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1298.8 (West 1980
& Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-22-201 to -223 (1987) (adopting UAA);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-408 to -424 (West 1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§
5701-5725 (1975) (adopting UAA); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1604301 to -4314 (1989)
(adopting UAA); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.01-.20 (West Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 9-9-1 to -83 (Supp. 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 658-1 to -12 (1985); IDAHO CODE
§§7-901 to -922 (1979) (adopting UAA); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, para. 101-123
(1987) (adopting UAA); IND. CODE §§ 34-4-2-1 to -22 (1986) (adopting UAA); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 679A.1-.14 (West 1987) (adopting UAA); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-401
to -422 (1982) (adopting UAA); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 417.045-.240 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988) (adopting UAA); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4201-4217
(West 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5927-5949 (1980) (adopting UAA);
MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-201 to -234 (1984) (adopting UAA); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, §§ 1-19 (West 1988) (adopting UAA); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 600.5001-.5305 (Callaghan 1988) (adopting UAA); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 572.08-
.30 (West 1988) (adopting UAA); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-15-101 to -143 (Supp.
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have generated a body of decisional law on arbitration. Moreover, a
few states have also enacted statutes addressing international arbitra-
tion.3 5 These statutes concern arbitration involving foreign commerce36
1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 435.350-.470 (Vernon Supp. 1989) (adopting UAA);
MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 27-5-111 to -324 (1989) (adopting UAA); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
25-2601 to -2622 (Supp. 1988) (adopting UAA); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38.015-
.205 (Michie 1987) (adopting UAA); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 542:1-10 (1974); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-1 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7-1 to -22 (1978) (adopt-
ing UAA); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 7501-7514 (McKinney 1980); N.C. GEN
STAT. §§1-567.1-.20 (1983) (adopting UAA); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-29.2-01 to -20
(Supp. 1989) (adopting UAA); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2711.01-.24 (Anderson
1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 801-818 (West Supp. 1989) (adopting UAA); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 33.210-.300 (1987); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7301-7320 (Purdon
1982) (adopting UAA); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-3-1 to -21 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§
15-48-10 to -240 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988) (adopting UAA); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 21-25A-1 to -38 (1987) (adopting UAA); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-301 to -
320 (Supp. 1988) (adopting UAA); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 224 to 238-6
(Vernon Supp. 1989) (adopting UAA); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-31A-1 to -18 (1987)
(adopting UAA); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5651-5681 (Supp. 1989) (adopting
UAA); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.01-.016 (Supp. 1989) (adopting UAA); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.04.010-.220 (1961); W. VA. CODE §§ 55-10-1 to -8 (1981);
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 788.01-.18 (West 1981); WYO. STAT. §§ 1-36-101 to -119 (1988)
(adopting UAA). Puerto Rico has enacted a similar statute. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32,
§§ 3201-3229 (1968).
35. See California International Arbitration and Conciliation Act, CAL. Clv.
PROC. CODE §§ 1297.11-.42 (West Supp. 1992); Florida International Arbitration Act,
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.01-.35 (West Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-30 to -43
(Supp. 1992); Hawaii International Arbitration, Mediation and Conciliation Act,
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 6580-1 to -9 (Supp. 1991); Maryland International Commercial
Arbitration Act, MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2B-01 to -09 (1990); TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 249 (Vernon Supp. 1990). Recently, Oregon and North
Carolina have also enacted International Arbitration Statutes.
36. See eg., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.13 (West Supp. 1992) which requires
the following for an arbitration to be deemed within its scope:
a. The parties to an arbitration or conciliation agreement have, at the time of
the conclusion of the agreement, their places of business in different states.
b. One of the following places is situated outside the state in which the parties
have their places of business:
1. The place of arbitration or conciliation if determined in, or pursu-
ant to, the arbitration or conciliation agreement.
2. Any place where a substantial part of the obligations of the com-
mercial relationship is to be performed.
3. The place with which the subject matter of the dispute is most
closely connected.
c. The parties have expressly agreed that. the subject matter of the arbitration
or conciliation agreement relates to commercial interests in more that one
state.
d. The subject matter of the arbitration or conciliation agreement is otherwise
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and either supplement 37 or preempt 8 the state's domestic statute.
A. Federal Arbitration Act
1. Legislative History
Historically, courts disfavored arbitration as a means of dispute
resolution.3 9 The source of this hostility to arbitration may be eco-
nomic: English courts received fees for hearing cases, and relinquishing
cases to an arbitrator meant forfeiting those fees.4" American courts
adhered to certain English common law principles, most notably the
principle that an agreement to submit to arbitration was voidable until
an award was issued.4 However, this common law rule of revocability
related to commercial interests in more than one state.
Id.
37. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-30 (Supp. 1991) (stating that the section of the code
which provides for arbitration of international disputes "shall be used concurrently"
with other provisions of the Georgia Code.).
38. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.17 (West Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
684.03(3) (West Supp. 1990); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2B-03 (1990);
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 249-1(8) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
39. The Senate considered three principal reasons when enacting the FAA:
[F]irst, the expressed fear on the part of the courts that arbitration tribunals
did not possess the means to give full or proper redress, and also the doubt
they entertained as to their right to compel an unwilling party to submit his
cause to such a tribunal, thus denying to him the right to submit the same to
the ordinary courts of justice for hearing and determination. Second, the jeal-
ousy of their rights as courts, coupled with the fear that if arbitration agree-
ments were to prevail and be enforced, the courts would be ousted of much of
their jurisdiction . . . . [Tlhird, established precedent has had its large part
of course in perpetuating the old rules long after the courts themselves could
no longer see that they were founded in reason or justice.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 2-3; see Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Armstrong
Trading Co., 126 F.2d 978, 983-85 (2d Cir. 1942) (explaining the development of the
ouster of the courts concept). But see Sayre, supra note 13, at 610 (questioning this
theory in early English cases).
40. See Kulukundis Shipping Co., 126 F.2d at 983-84.
41. Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874); Haskell v. Mc-
Clintic-Marshall Co., 289 F.2d 405 (9th Cir. 1923); Meachem v. Jamestown, F&C
R.R., 105 N.E. 653 (N.Y. 1914). The Senate Report explicitly states:
[Ilt is very old law that the performance of a written agreement to arbitrate
would not be enforced in equity, and that if an action at law were brought on
the contract containing the agreement to arbitrate, such agreement could not
be pleaded at bar of the action; nor would such an agreement be grounds for
a stay of proceedings until arbitration was had. Further, the agreement was
subject to revocation by either of the parties at any time before the award.
With this as the state of the law, such agreements were in large part ineffec-
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gradually began to lose support with the enactment of New York's ar-
bitration statute in 1920. ' The New York statute established that ar-
bitration provisions in contracts were binding.
In 1925, Congress, following the lead of the New York legisla-
ture"' and acting upon the business community's concerns for the de-
lays, expenses, and problems of litigation," enacted the FAA. 45 In
1922, the American Bar Association Committee on Commerce, Trade
and Commercial Law patterned the initial draft of the FAA after the
New York law"' and introduced it to Congress.4 In 1923, the Senate
tual, and the party aggrieved by the refusal of the other party to carry out the
arbitration agreement was without adequate remedy. Until recently in Eng-
land, and up to the present time in nearly, if not quite all, the States of the
Union, such has been the law in-regard to arbitration agreements.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 2; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, at 1-2.
42. N.Y. Arbitration Act, ch. 275, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803 (currently codified at
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 7501-7514 (McKinney 1980)); see also Raymond A.
Connell, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Expanding Impact of State Law Upon Rig-
orous Enforcement, 20 J. MAR. L. & COM. 327 (1989) ("This was the first statute
enacted in an American jurisdiction providing agreements to arbitrate future disputes
were enforceable and irrevocable, and it survived challenge as violative of constitutional
mandates limiting judicial power to duly constituted courts."). Id. at 329.
43. SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 3.
44. Id.; see also Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, The
United States Arbitration Law and its Application, I 1 A.B.A.J. 153 (1925). The 1925
Act was passed to remedy three problems:
1. The delay incident to a proceeding in our courts, which, in centers of com-
mercial activity where there exists congestion of the court calendars, fre-
quently amounts to several years. Contributing to this delay are the prelimi-
nary motions and other steps which litigants may take and the appeals which
are open to them.
2. The expense of litigation.
3. The failure, through litigation, to reach a decision regarded as just when
measured by the standards of the business world. This failure may result ei-
ther because the courts necessarily apply general rules which do not fit all
specific cases, or because the judge or the jury is not and cannot be made
familiar with the peculiarities of the given controversy. A judgement by men
[sic] particularly experienced in the given field is one of the greatest advan-
tages of arbitration.
Id. at 155-56 (1925).
45. Act of Feb. 12 1925, ch. 213, § 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (currently codified at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-15, 201-208 (1988)). For a detailed exposition of the legislative history of
the FAA, see Barbara Ann Atwood, Issues in Federal- State Relations under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 61, 76 (1985).
46. Hearings on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 1-3 (remarks by Charles Beinheimer), 7-9 (re-
marks by W.H.H. Piatt) (1923) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 42141.
47. S. 4214, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 64 CONG. REC. 732 (1922); H.R. 13,522, 67th
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Judiciary Committee heard testimony on the bill, but did not enact any
legislation. 8 However, in 1924, joint congressional hearings were held"9
and the bill was enacted into law."
Congress' power to enact the FAA is constitutionally derived from
(1) the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce," (2) the
power to create admiralty law,52 and (3) the power to establish proce-
dures for lower federal courts.5 3 Although it is unclear under which of
these constitutional delegations Congress enacted the FAA," some
commentators have suggested that Congress relied on its power to es-
tablish federal court procedure.55 The prevailing view, however, is that
Cong., 4th Sess., 64 CONG. REC. 797 (1922).
48. See Hearings on S. 4214, supra note 46.
49. Joint Hearvngs on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomm. of the Com-
mittees on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings].
The hearings were on S. 1005 and H.R. 646, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 65
CONG. REC. 11,081 (1924).
50. The House enacted the bill in its original form. 65 CONG. REC. 11,082 (1924).
The Senate amended and then passed it. 66 CONG. REc. 2761 (1924). The House
concurred in the amendments. 66 CONG. REc. 3003 (1924).
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
52. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2; see Atwood, supra note 45, at 76. Professor Atwood
notes:
Congressional power over admiralty and maritime matters is something of an
anomaly in constitutional law. The grant of federal court jurisdiction over
admiralty and maritime cases serves as the basis not only for the creation of a
maritime common law by the federal courts, but also for the enactment of
federal statutory law on the subject.
Id. at n.102 (citations omitted).
53. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Atwood, supra note 45, at 76. ("Congress'
power over federal court procedure derives from the power to establish the lower
courts."). Id. at n.103.
54. See Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy.- The Federalization
of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1314-16 (1985).
55. Atwood, supra note 45, at 76; Connell, supra note 42, at 331-32; see Joint
Hearings, supra note 49, at 37. Mr. Julius Cohen, a member of the American Bar
Association Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, the drafter of the
original proposal for a federal arbitration statute, described the legal basis for the bill:
It has been suggested that the proposed law depends for its vitality upon the
exercise of the interstate commerce and the admiralty powers of Congress.
That is not the fact. The statute as drawn establishes a procedure in the Fed-
eral courts for the enforcement of arbitration agreements. It rests upon the
constitutional provision by which Congress is authorized to establish and con-
trol inferior Federal courts. So far as Congressional acts relate to the proce-
dure in the Federal courts, they are clearly within the Congressional power...
• The primary purpose of the statute is to make enforceable in the Federal
courts such agreements for arbitration, and for this purpose Congress rests
solely upon its power to prescribe the jurisdiction and duties of the Federal
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Congress enacted the FAA pursuant to its power to control commerce
and create admiralty and maritime law."' As the Supreme Court noted
in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., the "[FAA] is based
upon and confined to the incontestable federal foundations of control
over interstate commerce and over admiralty.
57
2. Structure of the Act
The FAA is arranged into two chapters.58 Chapter one includes
the original provisions passed in 1925 along with the subsequent
amendments. 9 Chapter two covers international arbitration and pro-
vides the enabling legislation for the New York Convention. 0 The
Act's main goals are to bind private arbitration agreements and to pro-
vide a mechanism for the efficient and speedy resolution of disputes.61
Section 1 defines the central elements of the Act.6" The statute
defines "commerce" to include interstate as well as foreign commerce,
but the courts have interpreted the term with varying results.6 3 Gener-
ally, the Act is not applicable to transactions that are wholly
intrastate. 4
courts.
Id. at 37-38; see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 418
(1967) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[lt is clear that Congress in passing the Act relied
primarily on its power to create general rules to govern federal courts.").
56. Id.
57. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405.
58. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15, 201-208 (1988).
59. Id. §§ 1-15.
60. Id. §§ 201-208.
61. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985).
62. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) provides:
"Maritime transaction," as herein defined, means charter parties, bills of lad-
ing of water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished ves-
sels or repairs to vessels, collisions, or any other matters in foreign commerce
which, if the subject of controversy, would be embraced within admiralty ju-
risdiction; "commerce," as herein defined, means commerce among the sev-
eral States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or
in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or
between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the
District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing
herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.
Id.
63. See DOMKE, supra note 5, at 31-33.
64. See Report to the Washington Foreign Law Society on the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, reprinted in 3 Ohio S. J. Disp.
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The statute also requires the parties' intent to arbitrate. The par-
ties must indicate their intention to submit to arbitration for the agree-
ment to come within the purview of the FAA. 65 Intent is determined by
applying the federal substantive law of arbitration,66 and by using a
doubt test which questions whether "there are any 'doubts concerning
the scope of arbitrable issues.' "87 Case law also instructs courts to con-
sider "only issues relating to the making and performance of the agree-
ment to arbitrate" when determining the parties' intent.
8
Section one of the FAA notably defines certain relevant terms, but
also specifically limits their reach. For example, employment contracts
are explicitly excluded from the scope of the FAA.69 Other exceptions
have also been created under separate federal statutes and these excep-
tions have influenced courts that hear FAA cases.70
Resol. 303, 324 (1988) [hereinafter WFLS Report] (suggesting that if a transaction
involved purely intrastate matters and was brought in a state court, the state arbitra-
tion statute would control both the procedural and substantive proceedings); Judith A.
Mellman, Seeking Its Place in the Sun: Florida's Emerging Role in International
Commercial Arbitration, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 363, 370-71 (1987); see
also Tejas Development Co. v. McGough Bros., 165 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1948); Warren
Bros. Co. v. Cardi Corp., 471 F.2d 1304 (1st Cir. 1973). But see Associated Metals &
Minerals Corp. v. The Steamship Mihalis Angelos, 234 F. Supp. 236, 237-38
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Sumitomo Corp. v. Parakopi Compania Maritima, 477 F. Supp. 737,
740 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
65. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626
(1985) ("[Tlhe first task of a court asked to compel arbitration of a dispute is to deter-
mine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute.").
66. Id.; see also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24 (1983); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 400-04
(1967); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984).
67. Allison B. Overby, Note, Arbitrability of Disputes Under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, 71 IowA L. REv. 1137, 1143 (1986) (stating that the test used by federal
courts is whether "there are any 'doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues,' or if
the claim of arbitrability is 'plausible,' or if the scope of the clause is even 'fairly debat-
able or reasonably in doubt.' ").
68. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404.
69. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
70. See American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. McGuire & Co., 391 F.2d 821,
827-28 (2d Cir. 1968) (Sherman Act); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev.
Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1970) (patent laws). But see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628-29 (1985).
It is important to note that even though Mitsubishi Motors addressed claims aris-
ing under the Sherman Act, the international nature of the transaction ultimately per-
suaded the Supreme Court. Indeed, the American Safety doctrine was left intact inso-
far as domestic transactions are concerned. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628-
40. As the Court noted:
[W]e conclude that concerns of international comity, respect for the capaci-
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Section two contains the substantive provisions of the Act. 71 It
states that written arbitration agreements that address "any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce" 72 shall be construed as being "valid, irrevocable, and enforcea-
ble."173 The written document requirement is not strictly adhered to be-
cause the writing may be in any particular form.7 4 Additionally, the
FAA extends to future as well as existing disputes.7 5
Sections three 7 and four 77 provide two avenues of judicial enforce-
ties of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the
international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of dis-
putes require that we enforce the parties' agreement, even assuming that a
.contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.
Id. at 629 (emphasis added).
The Court was persuaded by similar concerns in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417
U.S. 506 (1974). Emphasizing the international scope of the transaction, it observed:
A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes
shall be litigated and the law to be applied is . . . an almost indispensable
precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to
any international business transaction . . . . A parochial refusal by the
courts of one country to enforce an international arbitration agreement would
not only frustrate these purposes, but would invite unseemly and mutually
destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical litigation advan-
tages . . . . [It would] damage the fabric of international commerce and
trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into
international commercial agreements.
Id. at 516-17.
71. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) provides in pertinent part:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereaf-
ter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the
whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration
an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.; see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, at 1. ("An arbitration agreement is
placed upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.").
74. Howard M. Holtzmann, United States, II Y.B. COMM. ARB. 116, 119 (1977).
75. Atwood, supra note 45, at 65.
76. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988) provides in pertinent part:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that
the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under
such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of
the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of
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ment. If litigation has already commenced, section three comes into
play. It allows a party to obtain a stay of litigation so long as the issue
is referable to arbitration and the petitioning party is not in default of
that agreement. 8 Section four addresses petitions by an aggrieved
party to compel arbitration proceedings when the other party refuses to
do so."' Both sections three and four require that independent jurisdic-
tion be established prior to a court ruling on the motion.80 Moreover,
judicial enforcement may be available in federal as well as state
court.8
the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in pro-
ceeding with such arbitration.
Id.
77. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988) provides in pertinent part:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United
States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction
under Title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit
arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that
such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement ....
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of
the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in is-
sue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitra-
tion in accordance with the terms of the agreement.
Id.
78. See supra note 76; see also Pioneer Supply Co. v. American Meter Co., 484
F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Okla. 1979).
79. See supra note 77.
80. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25
n.32 (1983). The Supreme Court observed:
The Arbitration Act ... creates a body of federal substantive law establishing
and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not
create any independent federal-question jurisdiction .... Section 4 provides
for an order compelling arbitration only when the federal district court would
have jurisdiction over a suit on the underlying dispute .... Section 3 likewise
limits the federal courts to the extent that a federal court cannot stay a suit
pending before it unless there is such a suit in existence.
Id.
81. Id. at 26 nn.34-35. The only proviso is that the arbitration agreement has to
fall within the purview of section two. See Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 67 Cal. App. 3d 19, 24-25 (1977) (section four); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Melamed, 405 So. 2d 790, 793 (Fla. 1981) (section three);
C.P. Assoc. v. Pickett, 697 S.W.2d 828, 830-31 (Tex. 1985) (section three).
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue yet. In Southland, the
Court sidestepped the issue by reserving until a later date the question whether "§§ 3
and 4 of the Arbitration Act apply to proceedings in state courts." Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1984). Similarly, in Volt Info. Sciences v. Board of
Trustees, the Court did not address the proper scope of §§ 3 and 4. Volt Info. Sciences
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Section five provides for the appointment of an arbitrator.82 The
arbitrator may be selected according to the terms of the arbitration
agreement or may be appointed by the court.8 In either case, the arbi-
trator has the power to subpoena documents or witnesses that are cru-
cial to the case.84
Although it contemplates judicial enforcement, the FAA does not
explain when judicial interference is appropriate or prohibited. Most
parties to commercial arbitration agreements generally disapprove of
judicial interference because it increases uncertainty as well as costs.
However, some parties employ the court's assistance to enforce or re-
view an extra-judicial arbitration award. Sections nine, ten and eleven
of the Act enumerate the court-ordered remedies a party has after a
final award is rendered. Section nine8" states that a party can ask a
court to confirm the arbitration award within one year after the
award.88 Generally, a domestic or international arbitral award must be
confirmed before the U.S. courts may enforce it. 87 Sections ten and
eleven catalog the alternatives available to a court for a party seeking
either to vacate or modify the award. Section ten 88 requires the court to
v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
82. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1988).
83. Id.
84. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1988).
85. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1988) provides in pertinent part:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgement of the court
shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall
specify the court, then at any time within one year after the award is made
any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order
confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order ....
If no court is specified in the agreement of the parties, then such application
may be made to the United States court .in and for the district which such
award was made.
Id. (emphasis added).
86. Court interference becomes necessary since arbitrators lack the legal authority
to compel the recalcitrant party to obey their award. See generally Robert B. von Meh-
ren, The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under Conventions and United States Laws,
9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 343, 343-44 (1983).
87. See supra note 85; see also 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1988) (pertaining to the interna-
tional arbitration awards being pursued in United States courts).
88. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988) provides:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon
the application of any party to the arbitration -
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitra-
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determine whether one of the specific grounds for vacation of an award
provided in this section exists.89 Importantly, section ten applies only to
purely domestic arbitration. Section eleven90 enables the court to mod-
ify an award if it contains a mistake, addresses a matter not submitted
for arbitration, or is imperfect in form.91 Finally, section fifteen92 over-
sees the appeal process.
Chapter two of the FAA also contains the legislation that imple-
ments the New York Convention.93 The Convention pertains to "arbi-
tral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where
the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought" as well as
tors, or either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the sub-
ject matter submitted was not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agree-
ment required the award to be made has not expired the court may,
in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
Id.
89. See Saxis S. S. Co. v. Multifacs Int'l. Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.
1967). The ability of a court to review the decision of an arbitrator is severely limited
in light of the federal policy favoring arbitration. Shahmoon Indus., Inc. v. United
Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, 263 F. Supp. 10 (D.N.J. 1966).
90. 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1988) provides:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order modifying or correcting the
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration -
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or
an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing,
or property referred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submit-
ted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the
decision upon the matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the
merits of *the controversy.
The order may modify and correct the award so as to effect the intent thereof
and promote justice between parties.
Id.
91. Id.
92. 9 U.S.C. § 15 (1990).
93. Congress passed the enabling legislation in 1970 to facilitate United States
business interests; see H.R. REP. No. 1181, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 4 (1970); S. REP.
No. 702, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1970).
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"arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where
their recognition and enforcement are sought.' 9 4
Thus, the Convention is applicable if the arbitral award is ren-
dered in a country other than the country in which enforcement is be-
ing sought. In addition to the arbitral awards, Article II of the Conven-
tion delineates the obligations of each contracting party."5 In essence,
each contracting party is bound to recognize agreements that are capa-
ble of settlement by arbitration unless a court finds the agreement to be
null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed.
Enforcement of an international arbitration, as defined by section
2029" of the Act, is controlled by section 207.1' It provides that when
judicial enforcement of an international arbitration award is sought in
the United States "[t]he court shall confirm the award unless it finds
one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement
of the award specified in the said Convention."' 8 Jurisdiction of an ac-
94. New York Convention, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208, art. 1, § 1.
95. Article II of the Convention provides:
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under
which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences
which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined
legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter
capable of settlement by arbitration.
2. The term "agreement in writing" shall include an arbitral clause in a con-
tract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an
exchange or letters or telegrams.
3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in
respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of
this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to
arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative
or incapable of being performed.
Id.
96. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1988) provides:
An agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely
between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the
Convention unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envis-
ages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable rela-
tion with one or more foreign states.
Id.
97. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1988).
98. Id. Article V of the Convention itemizes the following as grounds for refusal:
(1) The parties to the agreement were either incapacitated or the agreement
is invalid.
(2) Improper notice to the party against whom the award is invoked.
(3) The award is outside the scope of the arbitration agreement.
(4) The composition of the panel was either improper or not in accordance
with the law of the country where it took place.
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tion or proceeding under the Convention is specifically granted to the
federal district courts.9
3. Supreme Court Construction
The enactment of the FAA occurred at a time when federal courts
were empowered to create federal common law that pertained to issues
that were properly in front of them and that were not governed by state
statutes. 100 As early as 1842, the Supreme Court in Swift v. Tyson'0 '
authorized federal courts to disregard applicable -state law in "contracts
and other instruments of a commercial nature, the true interpretation
and effect whereof are to be sought, not in the decisions of local tribu-
nals, but in the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurispru-
dence."' 02 This authorization remained in effect until 1938 when, in
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins," 3 the Court curbed the power of federal courts
to create federal common law because in
[m]atters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
State. And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its
Legislature in a statute or by its highest court is not a matter of
federal concern. There is no federal common law. Congress has
no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable
in a State .. . .And no clause in the Constitution purports to
confer such power upon the federal courts.' 0 '
A few years later, the Court further explained the Erie principle in
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York. 10 5 In this case, the Court created an "out-
come-determinative" test and observed that:
[Erie] was not an endeavor to formulate scientific legal termi-
(5) The award has not become binding on the parties or been set aside.
(6) The subject matter of the difference is outside the scope of the arbitration
agreement.
(7) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the
public policy of that country.
New York Convention, supra note 94, at art. V (1),(2).
99. 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1988).
100. See Connell, supra note 42, at 330-31.
101. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
102. Id. at 18.
103. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
104. Id. at 78.
105. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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nology. It expressed a policy that touches vitally the proper dis-
tribution of judicial power between State and federal courts...
[thus] in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdic-
tion solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties,
the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be sub-
stantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome
of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.1"6
After these cases, the question of whether the FAA was proce-
dural or substantive became quite important. Erie clearly stood for the
proposition that federal courts did not have the power to declare sub-
stantive rules of common law. 107 Moreover, even if the FAA was
merely procedural, 108 if its use substantially affected the outcome, the
outcome-determinative test espoused in Guaranty Trust would deem
the FAA to be substantive. 109
In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America,110 the Court again
addressed this issue. Bernhardt involved a diversity suit between a citi-
zen of Vermont and a New York corporation. The issue was whether
the court could stay litigation pursuant to section three of the FAA.
The District Court denied Polygraphic's motion for a stay because "the
arbitration provision of the contract was governed by Vermont law and
• .. the law of Vermont makes revocable an agreement to arbitrate at
any time before an award is actually made.""' The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court disagreed with the
Second Circuit, holding that because the transaction did not deal with
a maritime or commerce issue, the transaction was not within the pur-
view of section two. In addition, the Court held that section three did
not create independent federal jurisdiction and was limited to transac-
tions enumerated in sections one and two of the FAA. "' In other
106. Id. at 109.
107. See supra note 104.
108. See generally Hirshman, supra note 54, at 1316-18.
109. Connell, supra note 42, at 332-33.
110. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
111. Id. at 199-200.
112. The Court observed that:
Sections 1, 2, and 3 are integral parts of a whole. To be sure, § 3 does not
repeat the words "maritime transaction," or "transactions involving com-
merce," used in §§ 1 and 2. But §§ 1 and 2 define the field in which Congress
was legislating. Since § 3 is a part of the regulatory scheme, we can only
assume that the "agreement in writing" for arbitration referred to in § 3 is
the kind of agreement which §§ I and 2 have brought under federal
regulation.
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words, because section two was inapplicable to the transaction, a fed-
eral court could not enforce arbitration except as provided by Vermont
law. Under Bernhardt, then, because the determination under section
two required substantive analysis, the FAA did not involve issues of
federal procedure. 113
Bernhardt did not, however, address the question of whether the
FAA or state law would apply to a transaction involving diversity and
interstate commerce. This issue was first addressed in Robert Lawrence
Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc."4 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit began its analysis by stating that the Congress, in enacting the
FAA, intended to "create a new body of substantive law relative to
arbitration agreements affecting commerce or maritime transac-
tions." 5 The court then traced the legislative history of the FAA and
asserted that in passing the Act, Congress relied on its "admiralty
power implied from article III, section 2, clause 3 and the commerce
power, article I, section 8, clause 3."116 In other words, the court char-
acterized the Congressional authority as being an exercise of the admi-
ralty and commerce power. Consequently, federal as well as state
courts could hear disputes under the FAA. because:
[t]he Arbitration Act in making agreements to arbitrate "valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable" created national substantive law
clearly constitutional under the maritime and commerce powers
of the Congress and . . . rights thus created are to be adjudi-
cated by the federal courts whenever such courts have subject
matter jurisdiction, including diversity cases, just as the federal
courts adjudicate controversies affecting other substantive
rights when subject matter jurisdiction over the litigation exists.
We hold that the body of law thus created is substantive not
procedural in character and that it encompasses questions of
interpretation as well as questions of validity, revocability and
enforceability of arbitration agreements affecting interstate
commerce or maritime affairs, since these two type of legal
questions are inextricably intertwined.' 1 7
This characterization was crucial because the Erie doctrine would have
Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 201.
113. Hirshman, supra note 54, at 1320.
114. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert denied, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
115. Id. at 404.
116. Id. at 406.
117. Id. at 409.
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otherwise limited the FAA's applicability.11 8 The Second Circuit af-
firmed its interpretation of the FAA as being substantive law in Metro
Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Construction Co." 9 The remain-
ing circuits, however, did not agree with the Second Circuit's
interpretation. 12 0
The Supreme Court finally resolved this uncertainty in Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.' Prima Paint, a
diversity suit, arose in the Second Circuit and concerned a fraud in the
inducement claim. The contract included an arbitration clause. 22 The
specific issue was whether the FAA could be applied to a contract in
interstate commerce in a diversity case where the FAA conflicted with
the applicable state arbitration law. The District Court granted the de-
fendant's motion to stay court action pending arbitration. Because the
Second Circuit found Robert Lawrence Co. controlling, it dismissed
Prima Paint's appeal.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider "whether Con-
gress may prescribe how federal courts are to conduct themselves with
respect to subject matter over which Congress plainly has power to leg-
islate."' 2 3 The Court found that Congress could do so because "it is
clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based upon
118. Connell, supra note 42, at 336-38. The commentator further points out that:
The early proponents of the FAA believed that it was the product of Congres-
sional power to prescribe procedural rules for the federal courts. Ironically, if
that held true, in light of Guaranty Trust the FAA would be consigned to
relative obscurity, inapplicable in state courts, and inapplicable to diversity
suits before the federal courts, limited solely to maritime and "federal ques-
tion" litigation.
Id. at 339.
119. 287 F.2d 382, 385 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961). The
Second. Circuit observed that:
the constitutional problems raised by applying the Act in diversity cases only
become operative if the Act is regarded as procedural in scope, and that since
Congress, drawing upon its commerce powers, created Section 2 of the Act a
rule of substantive law declaring certain arbitration agreements "valid, irrevo-
cable, and enforceable," the Act could constitutionally be applied in diversity
cases when the requisite commerce elements are present.
Id.
120. See generally James F. Nooney, Note, Commercial Arbitration in Federal
Courts, 20 VAND. L. REV. 607, 622-25 (1967).
121. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
122. Id. The clause stated "[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to
this agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in the City of New
York, in accordance ivith the rules then obtaining of the American Arbitration Associ-
ation." Id.
123. Id. at 405.
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and confined to the incontestable federal foundation of control over in-
terstate commerce and over admiralty."' 124 The Court reasoned that
contracts involving interstate commerce are within the purview of sec-
tion two of the FAA.1"' Because federal courts are bound to apply rules
that Congress enacts and because the FAA is derived from Congres-
sional authority over interstate commerce and admiralty, the federal
courts could avoid the pitfalls of Erie and Guaranty.2' Therefore,
Prima Paint instructed that actions properly brought under section two
of the FAA were to be decided as a matter federal substantive law
rather than procedural law.'27
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp."'28 further refined the scope of the FAA. The question presented
was whether a district court could stay a motion to compel arbitration
under section four of the FAA pending the resolution of a state court
action. 12 9 The Court stated that the "refusal [of the district court] to
proceed was plainly erroneous in view of Congress' clear intent, in the
Arbitration Act, to move the parties to an arbitration as quickly and
easily as possible."' 130 In other words, because exceptional circum-
stances were not present, the District Court had abused its discretion
by staying the arbitration proceeding.' 3 ' In Moses Cone, the Court ex-
pressly stated its implicit decision in Prima Paint'32 by observing that:
section [two] is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any
state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary. The ef-
fect of the section is to create a body of federal substantive law
of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within
the coverage of the Act. 33
124. Id. The Court did concede that at the time the FAA was enacted "Congress
had reason to believe that it still had power to create federal rules to govern questions
of 'general law.' " Id. at 405 n.13. The Court noted, however, that such a belief "was
only supplementary to the admiralty and commerce powers, which formed the principal
bases of legislation." Id.
125. Id. at 400.
126. Id. at 404-07; see also id. at 405 n.13.
127. Connell, supra note 42, at 338-41.
128. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
129. Id. at 7.
130. Id. at 22.
131. Id. at 26-27.
132. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984).
133. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added).
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Section two, therefore, is applicable in federal as well as state courts.
Prima Paint and Moses Cone established the national scope of the
FAA. However, the federal courts still lacked authority to decide the
extent to which the FAA preempted conflicting state statutes. The Su-
preme Court addressed this question in Southland Corp. v. Keating.""
The dispute arose when several California 7-Eleven franchise owners
brought suit against Southland, a Texas corporation, alleging fraud,
oral misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty,
and violation of the disclosure requirements of the California Franchise
Investment Law135 (CFIL). The issue was whether a particular section
of the CFIL,138 which invalidated certain arbitration agreements cov-
ered by the FAA, violated the Supremacy Clause. The California Su-
preme Court found that this section precluded arbitration because the
statute required judicial consideration of actions brought under the
statute.1
37
The Supreme Court held, however, that the California statute vio-
lated the Supremacy Clause because it conflicted directly with section
two of the FAA.1 8 The Court reaffirmed the national scope of section
two and observed that "[i]n enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress
declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power
of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims
which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration."' 39 The
Court did recognize two limitations on the FAA: the transaction in
question must involve commerce' 40 and revocation of such clauses can
only occur upon grounds existing at law or equity."4' However, once a
transaction involves interstate commerce, the FAA preempts state law
that inhibits the enforcement of arbitration agreements.' 42
134. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
135. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West 1977).
136. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512. This section provided that "[a]ny condition, stip-
ulation or provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive
compliance with any provision of this law or any rule hereunder is void." Id.
137. Keating v. Superior Court of Alemada County, 645 P.2d 1192, 1203-04
(Cal. 1982).
138. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10.
139. Id.
140. The Court interpreted this phrase "not as an inexplicable limitation on the
power of the federal courts, but as a necessary qualification on a statute intended to
apply in state and federal courts." Id. at 14-15.
141. Id. at 10-11.
142. Id. at 15-16. The Court, commenting on the scope of the FAA, noted that
"[i]n creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress
intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements." Id. at 16 (citations omitted).
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Perry v. Thomas 143 further explained the extent to which section'
two of the FAA preempts contrary state laws. This case involved the
California Labor Code, which permitted actions for the collection of
wages regardless of the existence of any private agreement to arbi-
trate.""' An employee of Kidder, Peabody & Co., relying on this stat-
ute, argued that judicial action against his former employer could be
maintained despite the presence of an arbitration agreement in his ini-
tial job application. 4 5 The Supreme Court held, however, that because
there was a direct conflict between the two laws, section two of the
FAA preempts the California statute. 4 6
Consistently since 1925, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
FAA as a national substantive law that favors arbitration notwith-
standing any state substantive or procedural rules to the contrary.
However, this preemptive effect of the FAA has been called into ques-
tion as a result of the Court's recent decision in Volt Information Sci-
ences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University.47
143. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
144. CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West 1971).
145. Perry, 482 U.S. at 484-85. The initial application contained a provision ad-
dressing arbitration. It stated:
I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between
me and my firm, or a customer, or any other person, that is required to be
arbitrated under the rules, constitutions or by-laws of the organization with
which I register.
Id. The employee registered with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), which had a
rule requiring that:
[any controversy between a registered representative and any member or
member organization arising out of the employment or termination of em-
ployment of such member or member organization shall be settled by arbitra-
tion, at the instance of any such party ....
Id. Kidder, Peabody & Co. was a member of the NYSE. Id. at 485-86.
146. Id. at 491-92. The Court reasoned that in upholding the arbitration clause it
was merely following its earlier decision in Dean Witter Reynold Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213 (1985). Byrd addressed the enforceability of private agreements. In following its
earlier precedent, the Court noted "[t]he preeminent concern of Congress in passing
the Act was to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered." Perry, 482
U.S. 490 (citing Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221). The Court then compared the possible out-
come of the litigation under the FAA and the California statute. The FAA would
uphold the arbitration agreement, while the California statute would not. Given the
strong federal policy concerns in upholding private agreements, the Court concluded
that section two of the FAA preempted the California statute. Id.
147. 489 U.S. 468 (1989). For a detailed analysis of this case, see Arthur S. Feld-
man, Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University: Confusing Federalism with Federal Policy Under the FAA, 69 TEx. L.
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At issue was a California statute which allowed a court to stay
arbitration proceedings pending the resolution of court action arising
out of the same transaction.14 8 Volt moved to compel arbitration due to
a term in the contract mandating the resolution of all claims through
arbitration. 149 Stanford, relying on the California statute, moved to
stay arbitration since the contract contained a choice-of-law provision
selecting California law. 15 0 The California Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower court's denial of Volt's motion to compel arbitration.
151
The Supreme Court affirmed by focusing on the choice-of-law pro-
vision. The Court reasoned that even though its prior holdings imply a
federal policy favoring arbitration, "[t]here is no federal policy favor-
ing arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal pol-
icy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to the terms, of
private agreements to arbitrate."15 By characterizing the issue as a
choice-of-law question, the Court found the California statute congru-
ent with the policies implied in the FAA.1 5 3 The Court asserted that
REV. 691 (1991).
148. Volt, 489 U.S. at 470; see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1281.2(c) (West
1982). The statute provides that:
On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a
written agreement to arbitrate a controversy, the court shall order the peti-
tioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy . . . unless it determines
that: ... (c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending
court action or special proceeding ... arising out of the same transaction or
series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on
a common issue of law or fact .... If a court determines that a party to the
arbitration is also a party to litigation in a pending court action ... the court
... (4) may stay arbitration pending the outcome of the court action or spe-
cial proceeding.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1291.2(c)(emphasis added); see also Board of Trustees
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Volt Info. Sciences, 240 Cal. Rptr. 558, 559 n.1
(1987).
149. Volt Info. Sciences, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 559. The arbitration clause provided
that:
[a]ll claims, disputes and other matters in question between the parties to this
contract, arising out of or relating to this contract or the breach thereof, shall
be decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbi-
tration Rules of the American Arbitration Association then prevailing unless
the parties mutually agreed [sic] otherwise .... This agreement to arbitrate.
. . shall be specifically enforceable under the prevailing arbitration law.
Volt, 489 U.S. at 470 n.1.
150. The contract choice-of-law provision stated "'[the Contract shall be gov-
erned by the law of the place where the Project is located.' " Volt, 489 U.S. at 470.
151. Id. at 476.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 479.
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the parties were well aware of the implications of choosing California
law to govern the contract."" Because California permitted a court to
stay arbitration proceedings pending the resolution of a court action
arising from the same transaction, the Court held that because:
the parties have agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration,
enforcing those rules according to the terms of the agreement is
fully consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the result is
that arbitration is stayed where the Act would otherwise permit
it to go forward. By permitting the courts to "rigorously en-
force" such agreements according to their terms,-we give effect
to their contractual rights and expectations of the parties, with-
out doing violence to the policies behind the FAA.15
The Volt Court was persuaded to uphold the California statute
since "It] he FAA contains no express pre-emptive provision nor does it
reflect congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration."' 56
Moreover, by focusing on the parties' choice-of-law clause, the Court
did not perceive any direct conflict with the FAA. 157 The Court ob-
served that upholding this clause Would merely enforce the parties' in-
tent that California law would govern the agreement.15
The Volt decision will have a significant impact on state commer-
cial arbitration statutes. Under Southland and Perry these statutes had
a limited role, but Volt supports an expansion of this role.'59 In interna-
tional commercial arbitration cases, any expansion should be limited
because of a prevailing federal interest in such matters.'60
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 477.
157. Id. at 477-78.
158. Id. at 479.
159. See Scott B. Harris, Report of the ABA Committee on the State Interna-
tional Arbitration Statutes, 1, 26-27, March 30, 1990 [hereinafter State Statute Re-
port]. The commentators suggest that in light of the Volt decision, state arbitration
statutes will play a bigger role. They point out that:
whatever the extent of the FAA's preemption of state procedures, it does not
preempt state procedures to which the parties agree. The Volt holding sug-
gests that by choosing the substantive law of a state, the parties may be gov-
erned by the state's arbitration rules even if an action is brought in federal
court and even if the state rules are at some variance with the FAA.
Id. at 27.
160. See id. at 25-26; see also infra notes 241-61 and accompanying text.
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B. State Arbitration Acts
All states have arbitration statutes, which increases the likelihood
of federal-state law conflicts. However, Volt suggested that preemption
occurs when a state statute limits the use of the arbitral process.", As
a general rule, Volt explained that state laws are preempted when
"[the state law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and exe-
cution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' 62 The Court
specifically stated that "[t]here is no federal policy favoring arbitration
under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to
ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agree-
ments to arbitrate."' 3 Similarly, if a state arbitration statute provided
for extensive discovery, the statute arguably could be the basis for seek-
ing court intervention in an attempt to order the arbitrators to allow
depositions even if the arbitration involved interstate or foreign com-
merce and was subject to the FAA. Thus, if
the parties have agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration,
enforcing those rules according to the terms of the agreement is
fully consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the result is
that arbitration is stayed where the Act would otherwise permit
it to go forward . . . [since doing so] give[s] effect to the con-
tractual rights and expectations of the parties, without doing
violence to the policies behind the FAA.16 4
This holding in Volt can be construed as injecting new life and vitality
into state arbitration statutes. 65
1. Domestic Arbitration Acts
Many state statutes are patterned after the Uniform Arbitration
161. See generally supra notes 147-60 and accompanying text.
162. Volt Info. Sciences v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477
(1988) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
163. Id. at 476.
164. Id. at 479.
.165. See State Statute Report, supra note 159, at 27. The authors of the Report
observe:
In short, the application of state law in international arbitration appears to be
growing after Volt. Indeed, the relationship between federal and state law
poses a problem because it is increasingly difficult to foresee when state rules
will apply, and to foresee which rules will be preempted and which will be
enforced.
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Act (UAA). 166 The UAA applies to any existing and future contro-
versy so long as there is a valid agreement to arbitrate."8 7 Judicial re-
view is available to determine if any errors have been made in the arbi-
tration process.' 68 A reviewing court can either confirm, vacate or
modify an award.6 9 An arbitration panel is empowered to issue sub-
poenas, 7' take depositions,17 1 modify an award,' 72 and assign arbitra-
tor's fees.' 73 The UAA is similar to the FAA since both are rather
limited in their scope. As a result, state statutes that adopt the UAA
without making substantive changes generally will not present conflicts
with the FAA. Several states, however, have made significant changes
to the UAA.174 For example, Texas' statute authorizes the arbitrators
to permit discovery depositions. Federal courts occasionally use these
statutes as procedural supplements in either an intra- or interstate
transaction. 75
2. State International Commercial Arbitration Acts
Several state legislatures have recognized the importance of arbi-
tration 17 in the international arena and enacted statutes to address
166. See supra note 34.
167. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 1; 7 U.L.A. 5 (1985 and Supp. 1992).
168. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 12-13; 7 U.L.A. at 140, 201-02.
169. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 11-13; 7 U.L.A. at 133-204.
170. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 7; 7 U.L.A. at 114.
171. Id.
172. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 9; 7 U.L.A. at 128.
173. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 10; 7 U.L.A. at 131.
174. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-6-1 (1977) (excluding agreements to arbitrate fu-
ture disputes); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679A1 (West 1987) (excluding contracts between
employees and employers); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-401 (1982) (excluding insurance
contracts and any provision of a contract providing for arbitration of a claim in tort);
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 230 (West 1973)(depositions for discovery purposes).
175. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202-03 (1956).
"The federal court enforces the state-created right by rules of procedure which it has
acquired from the Federal Government and which therefore are not identical with
those of the state courts"; see also Garvey & Heffelfinger, supra note 4, at 213. "Most
procedural aspects of arbitration not addressed in federal statutes or treaties can be
regulated by state or other local (domestic or foreign) law deemed by the finder of fact
to be applicable by reason of choice by the parties, or absent such choice, choice of law
principles." Id.
176. WFLS Report, supra note 64, at 326. The Washington Foreign Law Society
recommended that states may wish to adopt the Model Law to supplement their ex-
isting arbitration regime. The rationale was that such an enactment would improve the
existing state laws and indicate that the state was generally receptive to arbitration.
The authors of this article respectfully disagree.
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it."' 7 These statutes vary considerably in their approach178 and will be
briefly discussed in this section.
a. Florida
Florida was the first state to enact a statue addressing interna-
tional arbitration.179 The Florida International Arbitration Act (FIAA)
was enacted due to the perceived shortcomings of the existing arbitra-
tion code1 80 and to create an environment favorable towards arbitra-
tion.1 81 Part I of the FIAA provides the scope of the statute along with
definitions, 82 and part II specifies rules governing the arbitration pro-
ceedings.1 83 These rules were developed pursuant to the UNCITRAL
177. California International Arbitration and Conciliation Act, CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE §§ 1297.11-.432 (West Supp. 1992); UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. app. at 30 (West Supp. 1990); Flor-
ida International Arbitration Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.01 to .35 (West Supp.
1990); Georgia Arbitration Code, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-30 to -43 (Michie Supp.
1991); Hawaii International Arbitration, Mediation and Conciliation Act, HAw REV.
STAT. §§ 658D-1 to -9 (Supp. 1991); Maryland International Commercial Arbitration
Act, MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2B-01 to -09 (1990); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1.567.67 (1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.450 to .454 (1992); TEX. REV CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 249-1 to -43 (West Supp. 1992).
178. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-30 (stating that the section of the code
which provides for arbitration of international disputes shall be used concurrently with
other provisions of the Georgia Code) with CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1297.17 (stating
that the section of the code which provides for arbitration of international disputes
shall supersede other provisions of the California Code).
179. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.01-.35 (West Supp. 1990); see Mellman, supra note
64, at 374.
180. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.01-.20. The task force that drafted the statute was
concerned with the impotence of Florida state courts in addressing problems in the
international arbitration arena. See Carlos E. Loumiet et. al., Proposed Florida Inter-
national Arbitration Act, 16 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 591, 595 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter Proposed Florida].
181. The Florida Bar task force observed that:
This growth in the use of arbitration presents Florida with a genuine opportu-
nity. Given its geographic location, infrastructure, transportation and commu-
nication facilities, population with varied linguistic skills, service industries,
academic facilities, business and banking communities and well-developed le-
gal system, Florida could emerge over a period of time as a significant center
for international arbitration, particularly for disputes involving Latin America
or the Caribbean. Such a development would naturally complement the emer-
gence of Florida over the past fifteen years as a regional center for interna-
tional banking and commerce.
Loumiet, supra note 180, at 595.
182. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.01-.04.
183. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.05-.20. It is important to note that this section of
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Arbitration Rules.184 Part III delineates the relationship between the
court and the arbitration tribunal.1 85
The FIAA provides a mechanism that is favorable to arbitra-
tion. 86 Application of the Act is limited to written18 7 international ar-
bitrations.1 88 The Act's scope is quite broad because it places no limits
on the types of transactions covered 89 and it may be applicable within
or without the state.1 90 However, certain transactions are excluded
from the Act.19' Parties are given the freedom to fix the rules for arbi-
tration since portions of the FIAA can be excluded.' Several other
sections describe procedures that may be followed during the arbitra-
tion process. 93 Interim relief can be obtained from either the arbitral
the FIAA is not mandatory. In other words, party autonomy is maintained as an arbi-
tration agreement can be fashioned in any manner desired by the parties.
184. Mellman, supra note 64, at 378-79.
185. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.21-.35; see Mellman, supra note 64, at 385-86.
186. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.02. The statute specifically states that "[i]t is the
policy of the Legislature to encourage the use of arbitration to resolve disputes arising
out of international relationships and to assure access to the courts of this state for
legal proceedings ancillary to, or otherwise in aid of, such arbitration." Id.
187. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.02(2).
188. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.03. Domestic arbitrations continue to be subject to
the Florida Arbitration Code. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.01-.20.
189. The lack of specificity was intended to broaden the scope of the FIAA. Pro-
posed Florida, supra note 180, at 624-25.
190. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.05. The statute states:
This part shall apply to any arbitration within the scope of this chapter, with-
out regard to whether the place of arbitration is within or without this state,
if:
(1) The written undertaking to arbitrate expressly provides, or the
parties otherwise agree, that the law of this state shall apply;
(2) In the absence of a choice of law provision applicable to the
written undertaking to arbitrate, that undertaking forms part of a
contract the interpretation of which is to be governed by the law of
this state; or
(3) In any other case, the arbitral tribunal decides under applicable
conflict of laws principle that the arbitration shall be conducted in
accordance with the law of this state.
Id.
191. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.03(2) (real property (when expressly agreed to in
writing), domestic relations, and political disputes between two governments).
192. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.07. This freedom to exclude applies only to part II of
the FIAA. Id. §§ 684.05-.20.
193. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.05-.08 (initiation of the arbitration proceedings); §§
684.09-.12 (appointment and establishment of the arbitration tribunal); §§ 684.13-.16
(specifics of the arbitration proceeding including interim relief); §§ 684.17-.20 (appli-
cable law and the final award).
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tribunal 9 " or any "court, tribunal, or other governmental authority."' 96
The final sections"' deal with the interplay between the court and the
arbitration tribunal and provide grounds for compelling arbitration, ob-
taining a stay of court proceedings 97 and vacating an award. 198
b. California
The California International Arbitration and Conciliation Act' 99
(CIACA) was enacted in 1988.200 The Act enumerates a detailed set of
procedures that can be followed in an arbitration proceeding. 01 Its ba-
sic purpose is to grant parties the autonomy to pick and choose any of
the procedures delineated in the Act. 202 If, however, the agreement is
silent as to a particular aspect, the CIACA acts as a default
mechanism.203
The CIACA is divided into seven chapters. The first six chapters
incorporate the UNCITRAL Model Law, 04 with some modifications,
and the seventh chapter addresses conciliation. If agreements to cover
present and future disputes are in writing,206 the Act is applicable. The
scope, however, is restricted to arbitrations that occur within Califor-
194. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.16.
195. Id. The FIAA gives an arbitration tribunal the ability to seek assistance from
any court in such matters. Id. § 684.16(2). The interim relief section may, however, be
excluded by parties in their agreement. Id. § 684.07.
196. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.21-.35.
197. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.22. Interestingly, this section provides for a judge,
sitting without a jury, to make such determinations. Id.
198. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.25. These grounds are similar to those provided in
the New York Convention.
199. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.11-.431 (West Supp. 1992).
200. See Kenneth B. Wright, California's International Commercial Arbitration
Act: New Procedures for the Arbitration and Conciliation of International Commer-
cial Disputes, 17 INT'L Bus. LAW. 45, 45-47 (1989). For a brief summary of the rea-
soning of the California legislature in enacting this Act, see Mills, supra note 19, at
615-16.
201. Wright, supra note 200, at 45-47.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.191-.192. The parties can specifi-
cally agree to the procedures that the arbitration tribunal will follow. Id. However, if
the agreement fails to mention any procedures, the arbitration tribunal can conduct the
arbitration in the manner it considers proper. Id.
204. Chapters seven and eight of the UNCITRAL Model Law were not adopted.
These two chapters address the recourse against the award and the recognition and
enforcement of awards. The chapters are almost identical to the New York Convention
provisions that address the same topic. Therefore, the FAA or other applicable Califor-
nia law continues to govern these issues.
205. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.71-.72.
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nia.2°0 Other parts of the California Code dealing with international
commercial arbitration are superseded.20 7 The Act defines the interna-
tional status of a particular agreement rather broadly and emphasizes
the party's place of business."0 8 It also provides a laundry list of com-
mercial relationships. 0 9 An arbitration tribunal is empowered to rule
on its own jurisdiction," 0 subject to the review of a superior court.21 1
Parties to the arbitration can select the procedures that the arbitral
tribunal will follow, 21 2 the place of arbitration, 21 3 the language to be
used in the arbitral proceedings, 214 and the applicable rules of law.
2 15
The parties' failure to address these aspects in the agreement results in
206. Id. § 1297.12. This section specifically states that the CIACA "applies only
if the place of arbitration or conciliation is in the State of California." Id. (emphasis
added).
207. Id. § 1297.17.
208. Id. § 1297.12.
209. Id. § 1297.16. The following relationships are considered
to be commercial:
(a) A transaction for the supply or exchange of goods or services.
(b) A distribution agreement.
(c) A commercial representation or agency.
(d) An exploitation agreement or concession.
(e) A joint venture or other, related form of industrial or business
cooperation.
(f) The carriage of goods or passengers by air, sea, rail, or road.
(g) Construction.
(h) Insurance.
(i) Licensing.
(j) Factoring.
(k) Leasing.
(1) Consulting.
(m) Engineering.
(n) Financing.
(o) Banking.
(p) The transfer of data or technology.
(q) Intellectual or industrial property, including trademarks, patents, copy-
rights, and software programs.
(r) Professional services.
Id. This list is not exclusive and conceivably other commercial relationships may exist.
Id.
210. Id. § 1297.161.
211. Id. § 1297.166. This section allows any party to challenge the preliminary
ruling of the arbitral tribunal on the question of jurisdiction. Id. The tribunal, however,
can continue with its task pending the resolution of such a request. Id. § 1297.167.
212. Id. § 1297.91.
213. Id. § 1297.201.
214. Id. § 1297.221.
215. Id. § 1297.281.
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the arbitral tribunal making these decisions.216 Judicial intervention is
prohibited unless provided for in the CIACA or the federal law.217 If
the agreement covers the matter, a court may order to stay judicial
proceedings. 18 The CIACA also provides for interim measures219 along
with elaborate grounds for challenging and possibly removing an
arbitrator.2
c. Georgia
The Georgia Arbitration Code contains a separate section dealing
with international transactions.2" This section is used concurrently
with other sections of the Code.2 22 The Code's purpose is to promote
arbitration for resolving international disputes and to demonstrate
Georgia's commitment to international commerce.22 3 The statute fo-
cuses on either the domicile of one of the parties or the location of the
actual business undertaking.2 Most of the provisions are quite proce-
dural in nature. Parties have the ability to appoint arbitrators, 2 com-
pel arbitration proceedings, 26 and select the language to be used in the
216. Id. §§ 1297.192, 1297.202, 1297.222, 1297.283.
217. Id. § 1297.51.
218. Id. § 1297.81.
219. There are two possible avenues for obtaining interim measures. A party may
request such relief from a superior court either before or during the arbitral proceed-
ings. Id. § 1297.91. Such measures may include either an order of attachment to pro-
tect against the dissipation of party assets or a preliminary injunction intended to pro-
tect trade secrets or to conserve goods. Id. § 1297.93. A party may also request the
arbitral tribunal for interim measures. Id. § 1297.17 1. The right to petition the arbitral
tribunal, however, is subject to the restrictions present in the agreement since parties
can agree to waive this right. Id.
220. Id. §§ 1297.131-.136.
221. Georgia Arbitration Code, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-30 to -43 (Supp. 1992).
222. Id. § 9-9-30. The Georgia Code is unique since other international arbitra-
tion statutes have exclusive jurisdiction over matters in this arena. See, e.g., CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 1297.17; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.03(3) (West Supp. 1990).
223. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-30 to -43 (Supp.1992).
224. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-31 provides in pertinent part:
This part shall apply only to the arbitration of disputes between:
(1) Two or more persons at least one of whom is domiciled or estab-
lished outside the United States; or
(2) Two or more persons all of whom are domiciled or established in
the United States if the dispute bears some relation to property, con-
tractual performance, investment, or other activity outside the
United States.
id.
225. Id. § 9-9-7.
226. Id. § 9-9-6. The grant of a motion to compel arbitration operates to stay a
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arbitral proceedings. 2 7 Interim relief can be obtained from a court 228
or from an arbitral tribunal. 2 9 The tribunal is also authorized to rule
on its own jurisdiction2 30 and to determine the language of the arbitral
proceedings if the parties have failed to do so.231
d. Hawaii
The Hawaii International Arbitration, Mediation and Conciliation
Act232 (HIAMCA) is different from any of the other international ar-
bitration statutes. It establishes an independent, nonprofit educational
corporation to resolve disputes in international business transactions. 33
These corporations are known as "centers" '23 ' and are authorized to de-
velop rules governing arbitration proceedings. 235 The scope of the Act is
rather broad with emphasis placed on the residence of the parties.236
pending or subsequent action. Id.
227. Id. § 9-9-37.
228. Id. § 9-9-4(e) states:
The superior court in the county in which an arbitration is pending, or, if not
yet commenced, in a county specified in subsection (b) of this Code section,
may entertain an application for an order of attachment or for a preliminary
injunction in connection with an arbitrable controversy, but only upon the
grounds that the award to which the applicant may be entitled may be ren-
dered ineffectual without such provisional relief.
id.
229. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-35. The arbitral tribunal has the power to order mea-
sures which it deems appropriate including compelling a party to post bond or give
other security. Id.
230. Id. § 9-9-34. Unlike California, Georgia does not provide for a challenge to
the preliminary ruling of the arbitral tribunal on the question of jurisdiction. See CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 1297.166.
231. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-37.
232. HAW. REV. STAT. § 658D-1 to -9 (Supp. 1991).
233. Id. § 658D-5.
234. Id.
235. Id. § 658D-7.
236. Id. § 658D-4. The statute provides:
This chapter shall apply only to the arbitration, mediation, or conciliation of
disputes between:
(1) Two or more persons at least one of whom is a nonresident of the United
States; or
(2) Two or more persons all of whom are residents of the United States if the
dispute:
(i) involves property located outside the United States;
(ii) relates to a contract which envisages enforcement of perform-
ance in whole or in part outside the United States; or
(iii) bears some other relation to one or more foreign countries.
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Moreover, like the FIAA in Florida, 217 the HIAMCA is applicable
within or without the state.23 8 Limited interim relief2 39 is provided if
three conditions are met: the party has consented to the jurisdiction of
the Hawaii courts, the party resides in a country that has not ratified
the New York Convention, and the party does not possess adequate
assets in the state. 40
III. CONFUSION: ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF AMENDING THE FAA
As demonstrated above, several different statutory schemes are ap-
plicable to an international commercial arbitration proceeding. A party
may either be subject to the FAA, to a particular state domestic arbi-
tration statute24 1 or to a state international commercial arbitration stat-
ute. The multiplicity of laws produces uncertainty as to how an inter-
national commercial arbitration will be conducted in the United States,
which in turn deters foreign commercial interests.2 42 Notwithstanding
these issues or Supremacy Clause considerations,2 43 state legislatures
continue to enact international arbitration statutes. Clearly, interna-
tional commercial arbitration would be better served by federal uni-
formity. As justification for its actions, Florida cited the need to better
serve countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. 4 Similarly, Cali-
fornia and Hawaii recognized the opportunity to participate in interna-
tional commerce by passing such an act,2 4" while Texas wanted to send
a clear message to alien parties that it was interested in promoting in-
ternational arbitration. 48 Due to their inherent complexity, however,
many of the international arbitration statutes will only frustrate these
goals.247
id.
237. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.05.
238. HAw. REV. STAT. § 658D-4(d).
239. Id. § 658D-9(b). The relief is limited to posting a bond or other security
considered suitable by the center. Id.
240. Id.
241. Depending upon the state either the domestic arbitration, the international
arbitration statute or both of these statutes may be applicable. See supra notes 166-240
and accompanying text.
242. See CAL. Ctv. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.11-.42; FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 684.01-.35.
243. U.S. CONST. art. IV, cil 2.
244. Supra note 181.
245. See Mills, supra note 19, at 616.
246. Mont P. Hoyt, Proposed Texas International Arbitration Act, 52 TEX. B.J.
148 (1989).
247. See generally Garvey & Heffelfinger, supra note 4, at 212-21.
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A. The Inadequacies of the FAA and of State Arbitration Acts
Although Volt upheld a choice-of-law clause incorporated into a
contract, 48 Southland established the rule that federal law preempts
contrary state statutes.249 Whether the FAA preempts a state statute
granting procedural rights is difficult to predict after Volt. Volt was a
domestic case2 50 and the Supreme Court was not faced with the inter-
national concerns that it encountered in Mitsubishi Motors251 and
Scherk.2"2 The Court's endorsement of the FAA in such circumstances
remains strong, and thus, in international matters, the federal interest
will almost certainly prevail.2 53
It is important to note that even though case law would indicate
that the FAA does not create independent federal jurisdiction,154 each
of the cases dealt with chapter one255 of the FAA. However, chapter
two grants jurisdiction to federal district courts, thereby acknowledging
Congressional resolve to elevate the federal interest for international
matters. 2 6 This suggests that Congress prefers domestic arbitration
statutes, such as the FAA, to state international arbitration statutes.
Consequently, if a state statute infringes upon international matters
covered by the FAA, a court may be more inclined to find preemption.
However, the lack of more specific guidelines in resolving state and fed-
eral discrepancies leaves courts with the perplexing determination of
which law predominates.
The differences between state arbitration statutes and the FAA
also causes confusion among the parties to an arbitration as to which
statute governs their agreement. Uncertainty about governing law may
lead parties to request judicial intervention. Parties should not assume
248. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
249. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1984).
250. The California Court of Appeals acknowledged this fact in observing that "it
is apparent that were federal rules to apply, Volt's petition to compel arbitration would
have been granted." Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Volt
Info. Sciences, 240 Cal. Rptr. 558, 559 (1987).
251. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985).
252. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
253. See supra note 70.
254. Southland, 465 U.S. at 12; Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987);
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983).
255. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988).
256. 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1988). This line of reasoning is further buttressed by § 205,
which grants a defendant the right to remove a case falling under the New York Con-
vention to a federal district court. 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1988).
19921
220 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 16
that the federal preemption doctrine will remove any issue over con-
flicts between federal and state laws applicable to arbitration.
Most state international arbitration legislation is procedural in na-
ture.257 It has been suggested that Congress should amend the FAA to
incorporate some of the changes that the states have enacted.2 58 As it
reads today, the FAA is too general and too abbreviated to deter state
international arbitration statutes. Congressional action is warranted as
the states have taken it upon themselves to pass statutes in this
arena.259 Notably, state statutes differ in the scope of their applica-
tion260 and the availability of interim measures.26 1 This variance frus-
trates the central purpose for entering into an arbitration agreement:
certainty.
The above arguments support the need for a Congressional amend-
257. See supra notes 179-240 and accompanying text. An argument in favor of
such legislation is that because the FAA is quite skeletal, these statutes fill gaps to
provide more clarity to parties interested in entering into arbitration agreements. Such
an argument is not persuasive because institutional arbitration is the preferred mode of
conducting arbitration. See supra note 20. Moreover, organizations such as the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association and the International Chamber of Commerce are designed
to accommodate many of the concerns parties may have in entering into an arbitration
agreement. See supra notes 20-22.
258. See generally Garvey & Heffelfinger, supra note 4, at 209; State Statute
Report, supra note 159, at 2.
259. See supra notes 191-251 and accompanying text.
260. Compare CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1297.12 and TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 249-1(2) with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.01 and HAW. REV. STAT. § 658D-4 (appli-
cability of statute either within or without the state); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1297.13
and CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 50a-101 with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.03 and GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-9-31 (focusing on the place of business as compared to party domicile).
Some state statutes provide benefits that are unique. California has mandatory
disclosure requirements concerning the impartiality of arbitrators. These requirements
are quite broad in their scope and extend to "a person within the third degree of rela-
tionship to either" the arbitrator or his or her spouse. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §
1297.121(e). For a discussion criticizing the California approach, see Garvey and Hef-
felfinger, supra note 4, at 215-17. Georgia grants concurrent jurisdiction to its domestic
and international transactions statutes over matters pertaining to international arbitra-
tion. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-30. This means that an international practitioner must be
familiar with Georgia cases that involve international as well as domestic arbitration
statutes. Hawaii creates centers to formulate policies affecting international arbitration.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 658D-7. However, organizations such as the American Arbitration
Association and the International Chamber of Commerce already address such
concerns.
261. Compare CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1297.93 and TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN.
art. 249-9(3) with GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-35 (specifying available interim measures);
compare CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1297.91 with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-109
(restricting availability of interim measures from a court).
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ment to the FAA. Congress must insert specific language in the Act
establishing that the federal Act either expressly preempts state inter-
national arbitration laws or, at a minimum, reflects congressional intent
to occupy the entire field.
B. Amending the FAA to Clarify United States Federal Law on
International Arbitration
Commentators have suggested two separate methods for amending
the FAA. The Committee on Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Res-
olution of the City of New York has recommended limited amend-
ments of the FAA to include selected provisions of the UNCITRAL
Model Law.26 2 The ABA Committee on State International Arbitration
Statutes has gone a step further by suggesting that Congress repeal the
FAA and adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law. 263 Despite their different
approaches both propositions would have the same common effect:
transforming confusion to clarity.264
The United Nations Model Act265 serves as a model law for inter-
national commercial arbitrations and has been adopted and promoted
by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UN-
CITRAL). The UNCITRAL Model Law is a comprehensive document
that enumerates the procedural requirements of an arbitration proceed-
ing.266 These procedures could be utilized to alleviate some of the cur-
rent deficiencies of the FAA.
262. Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Ar-
bitration as Federal or State Legislation, Report of the Committee on Arbitration and
Alternative Dispute Resolution, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1
(1988) [hereinafter Alternative Dispute Resolution Report].
263. See State Statute Report, supra note 159, at 1-3.
264. The Model Law, however, should not be adopted by individual states because
doing so would foster additional conflicts between state and federal law.
265. The Model Law is organized into eight chapters and thirty-six articles. The
chapters address the following subject matters: (1) scope of application and extent of
court intervention (Ch. I, arts. 1-6); (2) stays of legal proceeding and interim measures
by court (Ch. 11, arts. 7-9); (3) the number and manner of appointment of arbitrators
along with grounds and procedures for challenge (Ch. IIl, arts. 10-15); (4) the compe-
tence of an arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction and its power to order interim
measures (Ch. IV, arts. 16-17); (5) the conduct of arbitral proceedings (Ch. V, arts.
18-27); (6) the making of award and termination of proceedings including the determi-
nation of the applicable law (Ch. VI, arts. 28-33); (7) recourse against the award (Ch.
VII, art. 34); and (7) the recognition and enforcement of awards (Ch. VIII, arts. 35-
36). 24 I.L.M. 1302-13. For a summary of the Model Law, see WFLS report, supra
note 64, at 306-07.
266. See supra notes 164-72 and accompanying text.
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1. Legislative History of the UNCITRAL
The U.N. General Assembly established the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law to "harmonize and unify interna-
tional trade law." 2 7 UNCITRAL has long recognized the importance
of arbitration and developed the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and
the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules.26 8 In 1977, the Asian-African Le-
gal Consultative Committee (AALCC), an inter-governmental body,
suggested that changes be made to the New York Convention to ad-
dress concerns regarding the ability of parties to choose the arbitration
rules.26 9 AALCC's suggestion ultimately led to the development of the
Model Law because "the necessary harmonization of the enforcement
practices of states, and the judicial control of arbitral procedure, could
be achieved more effectively by the promulgation of a model or uni-
form law, rather than by any attempt to revise the New York Conven-
tion . . ."'o The underlying theory of the Model Law is to "maximize
party autonomy and limit judicial intervention." '27 1 The Model Law
was well received and, in 1985, the UNCITRAL and the United Na-
tions General Assembly adopted it.2 72
2. Proposed Amendments to the FAA
As discussed above, the need for amendment and clarification on
267. HOLTZMAN & NEUHAUS, supra notL 15, at 4. Membership to UNCITRAL
is limited and consists of variety of nations including Third World countries. Id.
268. Id. at 5; 20 I.L.M. 714 (1981).
269. HOLTZMAN & NEUHAUS, supra note 15, at 9.
270. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 14, at 388.
271. Commercial Arbitration, supra note 9, at 125.
UNCITRAL considered the following policy objectives:
[1] The liberalization of international commercial arbitration by limiting the
role of national courts, and by giving effect to the doctrine of "autonomy of
the will" allowing the parties freedom to choose how their disputes should be
determined;
[2] The establishment of a certain defined core of mandatory provisions to
ensure fairness and due process;
[3] The provision of a framework for the conduct of international commercial
arbitrations, so that in the event of the parties being unable to agree on proce-
dural matters the arbitration would nevertheless be capable of being com-
pleted; and
[4] The establishment of other provisions to aid the enforceability of awards
and to clarify certain controversial practical issues.
REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 14, at 388.
272. See 24 I.L.M. 1302; G.A. Res. 40/72 (112th Mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/40/935,
at 620 (1985).
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the federal level is apparent. If Congress adopted parts of the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law, the parties to the arbitration and the courts will
clearly understand the law that governs international arbitration.
The United States courts are divided about whether the FAA can
grant interim relief."13 Several commentators have suggested that the
grant of interim relief is consistent with the New York Convention.274
Furthermore, providing such measures is consistent with the measures
available in other countries.2 75 The enactment of article nine27 6 and ar-
ticle seventeen177 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which respectively
allow a court and an arbitral tribunal to grant interim relief, would
resolve the current confusion.
Several provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law delineate the
powers granted to an arbitral tribunal.21 8 The substance of this power
rests in three articles. Article twelve addresses the impartiality of an
arbitrator and requires disclosure of "any circumstances likely to give
rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence. ' 27 9 Ar-
ticle thirteen provides the procedure that a party must follow when
challenging an arbitrator.20 Finally, article sixteen authorizes the arbi-
273. Compare McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT, S.A., 501 F.2d 1032 (3d
Cir. 1974) and Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 442 N.E.2d 1239 (N.Y.
1982) (denying pre-award attachment) with Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex,
451 F.Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (allowing pre-award attachment). See generally
Mills, supra note 19, at 604. The primary purpose in granting interim relief, which
may take the form of an attachment or injunctive relief, .is to maintain jurisdiction over
the party and to ensure that the assets are not dissipated. DOMKE, supra note 5, at 404-
07.
274. See McDonell, supra note 14, at 273; Kevin J. Brody, Note, An Argument
for Pre-Award Attachment in International Arbitration under the New York Conven-
tion, 18 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 99, 124 (1985).
275. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 14, at 232.
276. 24 I.L.M. 1302 (1985). Article 9 states that "[ilt is not incompatible with an
arbitration agreement for a party to request, before or during arbitral proceedings,
from a court an interim measure of protection and for a court to grant such measure."
Id. at 1304.
277. Id. at 1307. Article 17 provides:
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the re-
quest of a party, order any party to take such interim measures of protection
as the arbitral tribunal may consider necessary in respect of the subject-mat-
ter of the dispute. The arbitral tribunal may require any party to provide
appropriate security in connection with such measures.
Id.
278. See supra note 265.
279. 24 I.L.M. 1305.
280. Id. at 1306.
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tral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction. 81 The incorporation of
these articles into the federal law has been criticized because of the
potential for increased litigation and delay. 82 However, the FAA does
not contain any such comparable provisions and current state interna-
tional arbitration statutes vary considerably.
In addition, article thirteen2 83 and article sixteen2 8 " specifically
state that the arbitral proceedings shall continue pending any such ap-
peal, thereby mitigating the occasion for unnecessary delays. Thus, en-
actment of these procedural guidelines will provide much needed clar-
ity in this area.
Congress should also adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law articles
dealing with the geographic location of the arbitral tribunal and the
choice-of-law provisions. Article twenty authorizes the arbitral tribunal
to select the place of arbitration if the parties have not done so.2 8 5 The
tribunal is specifically advised to consider "the circumstances of the
case, including the convenience of the parties."' 8 6 Article twenty-eight
of the Model Law addresses the choice-of-law provisions.2 87 If the par-
ties do not designate the appropriate rules of law applicable to the arbi-
tration proceeding, the arbitral tribunal is empowered to do S0.288
Whereas section four 8 9 and 206290 of the FAA address the ability of a
court to hear matters that are properly before it, the FAA does not
grant authority to a court or to a arbitral tribunal to choose the place
of arbitration when the parties have failed to do so. Furthermore, the
281. Id. at 1306-07. The ability of an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdic-
tion has been termed "Competence/Competence." See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra
note 14, at 213-16. This is generally recognized as the modern trend in arbitral pro-
ceedings. Id. at 395.
282. Alternative Dispute Resolution Report, supra note 262, at 10-13.
283. 24 I.L.M. 1306. Article 13 in its pertinent part provides that "while such a
request is pending, the arbitral tribunal, including the challenged arbitrator, may con-
tinue the arbitral proceedings and make an award." Id.
284. Id. at 1306-07. Article 16 provides that "[i]f the arbitral tribunal rules as a
preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, any party may request ... the court speci-
fied in article 6 to decide the matter ...." Id.
285. 24 I.L.M. 1307. Article 20 in its pertinent part provides that "[t]he parties
are free to agree on the place of arbitration. Failing such agreement, the place of arbi-
tration shall be determined by the arbitral tribunal having regard to the circumstances
of the case, including the convenience of the parties," Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1309.
288. Id.
289. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
290. 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1988).
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applicability of section four in state courts is unclear.291
In addition to its other deficiencies, the FAA does not embrace
any guidelines regarding the choice of substantive law to an arbitration
proceeding. Therefore, the enactment of articles twenty and twenty-
eight of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which address this issue, has the
potential to clear away the current ambiguity.
It is beyond the scope of this article to suggest the specific lan-
guage that Congress should utilize if it were to amend the FAA. How-
ever, Congress should at a minimum make the following changes: (1)
address the ability of a court or an arbitral tribunal to grant interim
relief; (2) provide for specific disclosure requirements for arbitrators;
(3) grant the arbitral tribunal power to rule on its jurisdiction; (4) clar-
ify the venue selection provisions; and (5) articulate specific choice-of-
law provisions.
IV. WHAT THE STATES SHOULD Do UNTIL THE FAA Is AMENDED:
THE MARYLAND APPROACH
Until Congress and the President establish a comprehensive fed-
eral statutory framework for the process and enforcement of interna-
tional commercial arbitration, states should follow the Maryland ap-
proach. Maryland's statute, the Maryland International Commercial
Arbitration Act292 (MICAA), defers to federal law for international
arbitrations that take place in Maryland. 93 By opting not to enact its
own international arbitration statute, Maryland rejected the course
chosen by other states. The MICAA aims to add certainty and uni-
formity to the business and legal climate for international arbitration in
Maryland 94 by providing for the exclusive applicability of federal law
291. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Report, supra note 262, at 13-15 (sug-
gesting that court interpretation of section four is unclear).
292. MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2B-01 to -09 (1992).
293. The International Commercial Law section of the Maryland State Bar Asso-
ciation drafted and approved the Maryland International Commercial Arbitration Act
(MICAA). The Maryland General Assembly passed the MICAA, which became effec-
tive on July 1, 1990.
294. Prior to drafting the MICAA, the Maryland Bar examined the statutes en-
acted by Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, California, and Connecticut. They ultimately re-
jected the course chosen by the other states, however, concluding that:
these states have not taken the best course. They have adopted statutes which
set different rules in their states for international commercial arbitrations -
different from their domestic arbitration statutes and different from the
United States federal law. These statutes, therefore, increase the potential for
more disputes to end up in court. They do not make law uniform; instead,
these other state statutes make the law more diverse and less certain.
1992]
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to the process and enforcement of international commercial arbitration
in the state.
Maryland's approach brings the portion of its state law that deals
with international commercial arbitration into harmony with the
United States law. This approach is consistent with any proposed im-
provements on the federal level, whether by amendments to the FAA
or adoption of the United Nations Model Act.
The first section of MICAA defines its scope.2 96 The definition of
international commercial arbitration is taken primarily from the fed-
eral statue dealing with the enforcement of foreign arbitration
awards2 96 and is compatible with the definition contained in the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law. 97 The purpose of the Act is to make Maryland a
more attractive site for international commercial arbitration by elimi-
nating any application of Maryland law to international arbitration
proceedings. The second section of the Act expressly recognizes this
concern.
298
The third section is the core of the Act. 99 It states that Maryland
law relating to the process and enforcement of international commer-
cial arbitration and arbitration awards shall be the same as United
States law dealing with arbitration. This deference to federal law pro-
motes uniformity and certainty in the process and enforcement of inter-
national commercial arbitration. Moreover, the Act does not in any
way limit the ability of the parties or an arbitral tribunal to choose
substantive law governing the performance of the contract.
The fourth section empowers Maryland state courts, along with
federal courts, to handle matters relating to international commercial
arbitration. 300 The sixth section addresses interim measures available
Frances J. Gorman, Arbitration Act Makes Maryland Attractive For Settling Dis-
putes, THE DAILY RECORD, June 6, 1990, at 22.
295. MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2B-01 (1992).
296. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1988).
297. 24 I.L.M. 1302.
298. MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2B-02 states:
The purpose of this subtitle is to:
1. Promote international commercial arbitration in this State;
2. Enforce arbitration agreements by parties in international com-
mercial transactions;
3.Facilitate the prompt and efficient resolution by arbitration of dis-
putes in international commercial agreements and transactions; and
4. Promote uniformity in the law of international commercial arbi-
tration in the United States.
Id. (emphasis added).
299. Id. § 3-2B-03.
300. Id. § 3-2B-04.
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under the MICAA.301 This section represents an addition to the rights
parties have under the FAA. It is not in conflict with the FAA, how-
ever, and is consistent with the UNCITRAL Model Law. Specifically,
it makes clear that an arbitral tribunal in Maryland that hears an in-
ternational commercial arbitration may order either party to post pre-
award security in appropriate circumstances where there is just cause.
This section also sets the standard for review by a court if a party
challenges an order issued by the arbitral panel as to the posting of
pre-award security. The premise is that the court should enforce the
tribunal's order unless the tribunal has abused its discretion.
The seventh section limits court intervention into international
commercial arbitration proceedings to those permitted under United
States law.302 The FAA is silent on court intervention.
One area in which the Maryland statute differs from the FAA
concerns the FAA's use of a jury only to determine whether the parties
made an arbitration agreement. The MICAA requires the courts to
make any decisions concerning the MICAA without a jury. MICAA
did not adopt this federal provision because it is complex and because it
would have explicitly contradicted the existing Maryland domestic stat-
ute on the same point. 3 Moreover, allowing a court to make determi-
nations without a jury is consistent with the process familiar to many
foreign businesses.
V. CONCLUSION
The main reason parties enter into an arbitration agreement is to
resolve disputes quickly, fairly, and inexpensively. The enactment of
state international commercial arbitration statutes threatens to frus-
trate these goals. These state statutes vary considerably in their ap-
proach and contain different procedural guidelines. Under Volt, federal
301. Id. § 3-2B-06.
302. Id. § 3-2B-07. This section follows article five of the UNCITRAL Model
Law. See 24 I.L.M. 1304. MICAA initially contained a provision allowing intervention
to correct any proceedings in conflict with the public policy of the State of Maryland.
This provision was eliminated since it was viewed by foreign attorneys as permitting a
very wide loophole intended to permit, and indeed encourage, court intervention in in-
ternational commercial arbitration proceedings held in Maryland. Letter from Francis
J. Gorman to Delegate Timothy F. Maloney (January 28, 1991) (recommending that
the Act be amended to eliminate the provision in question) (copy on file with MD. J.
INT'L. L. & TRADE).
303. The Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act provides that "[t]he court shall
make any determinations provided for in this subtitle without a jury." MD. CODE ANN.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-204.
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courts will be more tolerant of state statutes that provide procedural
devices. Many state international commercial arbitration statutes con-
tain procedural devices that may well present a trap for the unwary.
The uncertainty engendered by these statutes will cause international
business to avoid the United States as a site for arbitration.
The Maryland Legislature avoided the pitfalls inherent in multiple
schemes by choosing expressly to follow federal law in international
commercial arbitration proceedings. A better response is to amend the
FAA. In the meantime, parties to a Maryland arbitration only need be
concerned about one source of law, federal law, rather than three or
four different sources of applicable law. This approach will alleviate
much of the uncertainty and should minimize expenses caused by dis-
covery and judicial intervention in arbitration proceedings.
